We show that the existence of one
Introduction
One of the basic primitives in cryptography and other areas of computer science is a pseudo-random generator. A pseudo-random generator can be used to build secure private key encryption protocols ( [Goldwasser, Micali 821, [Gold. leich, Goldwasser,  Micali S4], [Luby, Rackoff SG] On the other hand, there are many natural problems that a.re conjectured to be one-way functions, whereas it is hard to think of a natural example of a conjectured (perfect) pseudo-random generator. Thus, it is desirable to convert what seems to arise natura.lly (one-wa.y functions) into a valuable commodity (a pseudo-random generator). The first construction of a pseudo-random generator [Blum, Micah S2] is based on the intracta,bility of the discrete log problem.
pa.0 821 generalizes this by showing tha.t a pseudo-random generator can be constructed from any one-way permutation. [Levin S5] shows that the existence of functions that are one-way on a quadratic number of iterates is necessary and sufficient for the existence of pseudo-random genera.-tors. [Goldreich, Krawczyk, Luby SS] show that any one-way function for which the preimage sizes of all elements in the range are roughly equal is sufficient. (The actual condition is slightly weaker.) We show that the existence of one-way functions is necessa.ry and suficient for the existence of pseudoPermission to copy without fee all or part of this material is granted provided that the copies are not made or distributed for direct commercial advantage, random generators in the following sense. Let f be an easily computable function such that when z is chosen randomly:
(1) from f(z) it is hard to recover an z' with f(z') = f(z) by a small circuit, or; (2) f has small degeneracy and from f(z) it is hard to recover z by a fast algorithm.
From one-way functions of type (1) or (2) we show how to construct pseudorandom generators secure against small circuits or fast algorithms, respectively, and vice-versa.
Notation
: Let x and y be bit strings. Then, 121 is the length of x, x o y is the concatenation of x and y, xi is the jth bit of 2 and c t i is the first i bits of x. If (3~ is a number, then (Q( is the absolute value of Q. Let CC and y be two equal length bit strings.
x @ y is the inner product mod 2 of CC and y and x $ y is the vector sum mod 2 (i.e. bitwise parity) of x and y.
Security
In this paper we consider both uniform and nonuniform models of security.
The difference between the two models of security is that, in the uniform model, the adversary is a fast algorithm, whereas, in the non-uniform model, the adversary is a small circuit.
At first glance, the non-uniform notion of security seems too strong of a requirement to place on a cryptographic protocol. However, a protocol that is only secure in the uniform sense is susceptible to the following type of attack. The time allowed for computation by an adversary before the protocol begins may be much greater than the allowable time during the protocol.
The result of the preprocessing can then be used by the adversary to break the protocol within the allowable time. Security in the non-uniform model is equivalent to immunity from this type of attack (see [Karp, Lipton SO] ). Also, the existence of a pseudo-random generator with non-uniform security is used to prove that BPP c DTime(2n') for every 6 > 0 [Yao 821.
Definition (resources)
: A resource class R is class of functions from N to N that includes the identity function I = 7~. If r'(n) 5 r(n) E R then r'(n') + 1 E R. Finally, log,(r(n)) < n is monotone. with respect to resource class R if for all T E R, for almost all n, p(n) 5 l/r(n).
For the remainder of the paper, unless stated otherwise, a feasible a.dversary a.lgorithm is always with respect to an arbitrary but fixed resource class R.
For each cryptographic task that we define, there are implicitly two definitions being made simulta.neously, one with respect to the uniform and the other with respect to the non-uniform model of security. Unless otherwise stated, each definition, lemma, proposition and theorem has two versions, one in each model.
One-way functions
Intuitively, a. function f is one-zuay if it is easy to compute but hard to invert, i.e. given z the value of f(z) can be computed in polynomial-time but every feasible algorithm that receives as input f(z) (when z is a randomly chosen string of length n) can output a y such that f(y) = f(z) with only negligible probability. It ha.
s not yet been proven that one-way functions exist (if P = NP then they certainly do not exist, but even if P # NP it is not clear if they exist), but there a.re many examples of functions that seem to be one-way in practice and that are conjectured to be provably one-wa.y. Some examples of conjectured one-way functions a.re factoring a composite number N that is the product of large randomly chosen primes, square roots modulo such an N, discrete log modulo a large randomly chosen prime, problems from coding theory aad the subset sum problem.
Notation
(functions and probability ensembles)
: A leng2h (funclion) r(n) is a monotone increasing function from JV to N such that r(n) is computable in time polynomial in n. A function f with input length m(n) and output length r(n) specifies for each 72 E N a function fn : (0, l}m(n) -+ (0, l}'("). For simplicity, we write f(z) in place of fn(z). We say that f is polynomial-tim.e compu2able if there is a polynomial-time Turing machine that on input 2 E (0, l}'(") computes f(z).
A pTobability ensemble D with length m( ) n assigns to each positive integer n a probability distribution D, on bit strings of length m(n). The anifo~rn ensemble U assigns to each positive integer 71 the uniform probability distribution U, on strings of length n. For X c (0, l}"("), D[X] is the sum over all z E X of the probability of x with respect to D,,. We use the notation 2 ED (0, l}n(n) to mean that x is ra.ndomly chosen from (0, l}nz(n) according to D,. We say that D is polynomialsanzplable if there is a polynomial-time Turing machine M wit,11 input length It(n) and output length m(n) such that, for each n E iv, M(z) ED (0, l}m(n) when 2 EU (0, l}k(n).
Define f(D) to be the probability ensemble with length I(n), where f (&) is the probability distribution defined by the random variable f(z) when x ED (0, l}m(n).
For random variable X defined with respect to Q,, Exp[X] is the expected value of X. 13 is used for probability.
Note : Hereafter, unless stated otherwise, f is always a polynomial-time computable function with input length 11 aud output length i(n) and D and E are a.lways proba.bility ensembles with length n.
Definition
(one-way function) : We say that f is weakly one-luay on U if, for every feasible algorithm M, the inverting probability .Pr[z = M(f(z))] when x EJJ (0, l}" is negligible.
We say that f is somewhat oibe-wtly 01~ n if, for some constant c > 0, for every feasible algorithm M, the inverting probability l'r[f(zz) = f(~(f(x)))] when 2 ED {O,l>" is at most 1 -1/7~~. We say that f is one-way on D if, for every feasible algorithm M, the inverting probability Pr[j(z) = f'(ng(f(z)))] when z ED (0, l}n is negligible.
We sa.y that f is o?Le-way if f is one-way on u.
If a function is one-lvay then it is both weakly oneway and somewhat one-way. The proof of Theorem A can be found in Section 5. The following definitions are necessary to state our next main theorem. The following definition is from [Shannon] .
Definition (Shannon entropy) : The (Shannon) entropy of D, is given by There is a polynomial-samplable D and f so that f is weakly one-way and has degeneracy 0( 1) on D.
Proof : (-) Without loss of generality, let f be a pseudo-random generator such that on input length n the output length is 2n (see Proposition 1.2). Let g(z) = f(x) 1' IL] and let gi(z) be the ith iterate of g on 2, i.e. go(x) = 2 and gi+i(z) = g(gi(x)).
Let D, be the distribution given by gi(z) when 2 EU (0, l}" and i EU {O,...,n}.
Note that D is polynomialsamplable.
The degeneracy of g on D is the average over i of the degeneracy of g on gi(z) when x Eu (0, I}", which is at most (n -0)/n = 1. The degeneracy of f on D is thus at most 1, because it is at most the degeneracy of g on D.
We now show that f is one-way on D. Since f is a pseudo-random generator, every feasible algorithm has negligible probability of distinguishing D from Li (as in the definition of pseudo-random generator, where D takes the role of f(x)).
This follows using an argument similar to that used in [Goldreich, Gold- wasser, Micali 841. We claim that f is one-way on U.
Let J1 be any feasible algorithm that has inverting probability p(n) for f on U that is non-negligible.
Then, we can use M to distinguish between f(Un) and Uz,, with probability at least p(n) -1/2n. The distinguisher simply outputs 1 on input y E {0, l}2n if f(M(y)) = y. The probability that for y EU (0, 1}2n there exists an x E {O,l}" with f(x) = y is at most l/an, from which the claim follows. Any feasible algorithm to invert f on D must either distinguish D from U or invert f on U. Since both of these are impossible from the above, f is one-way on D. ) and (a.s in the proof) "weakly one-way" is replaced with "one-way"; (2) in the +-direction of the theorem, O(1) degeneracy is replaced with lod+N.
h(+)> cannot be replaced with anything asymptotically bigger for the following reason. No algorithm on input f(x) can output y such that y = x with proba.bility greater than l/If-'(x)] when 2 Eu {O,l}".
Let s(n) be such that for a.11 1' E R, linifl-+03 {r(n)/s(n)} = 0. Then, f(z o y) = 2, where (y] = log(s((z()), has degeneracy log(s(lz)) and is weakly one-way. On the other hand, f is useless for constructing a pseudo-ra.ndom generator.
We now define a type of one-way function whose existence is equivalent to that of pseudo-random generators. This characterization is useful in proving Theorem B.
Definition (hidden bit)
: A bit (function) 6 for f is a poiynoniial-time con~puta.ble function with input length n that outputs a single bit. The dis1inguishin.g probability p(lz) of algorithm A4 for f and b on D is [Pr[fV(f(c) 
6 is hidden for f on D if every feasible a.lgorithm has negligible distinguishing probabilit,y for f on D. G is hidden for f if it is hidden for f on U. The following is from [Goldreich, Levin 801. 1.3 (weakly one-way -+ inner product bit is hidden)
: Assume that f is weakly one-way on n. Let f', D' and bit b for f' be defined in terms off and .D as in. the inner product bit definition.
Then, b is hidden for f' on D'.
The idea of a function that hides a bit was introduced in the original construction of a pseudorandom generator [Blum, Micali 821 If there is a bit b that is both .hidden and meaningful for f then there is a pseudo-random generator.
The proof of Theorem C can be found in Section Intuitively, if a distribution has min-entropy k, it is "at least a.s random" as the uniform distribution on k bit strings. There are distributions that have arbitrarily large entropy but have only one bit of minentropy.
Some of the definitions given in this subsection are computational analogues of the statistical definitions given in the previous subsection. The following definition appears in [Goldwasser, Micali 821, [Yao 821 and [Goldwasser, Micali, Rackoff 851 .
The distinguishing probability function p(n) of algorithm A4 for D and E is ) Pr[dB(z) = l] -Pr[A4(z') = 111 when 2 EI> (0, l}" and 2' EE (0, l}n. D is computationally indistinguishable from E if fea.sible algorithm has negligible distinguishing probability.
The following two propositions are the crucial point in this pa.per where constructions involving the uniform and non-uniform models of security diverge. Although analogs of each other, these two propositions have a subtle difference in a.ddition to the notions of security involved.
Both say, intuitively, that, if two ensembles a.re computationally indistinguishable, then many samples from one ensemble are indistinguishable from many samples of the other. If the ensembles in question are both polynomial-samplable, then Proposition 2.3 says this is true with respect to both models of security. However, Proposition 2.4 says that in the non-uniform model it is also true for arbitrary ensembles. The reason for this difference is as follows. In the uniform model of security, receiving several samples from an ensemble that is not polynomial-samplable might give an adversary information that it could not compute itself. This extra information might allow the adversary to be able to distinguish between the two ensembles. However, this kind of information can never be helpful to a non-uniform adversary, since it is succinctly describable (being extracted from a polynomial number of polynomial length samples) and hence could be included in the non-uniform "advice" string. This distinction has repercussions throughout the paper and is ultimately the reason why our proof of Theorem A does not hold in the uniform model of security. The following propositions appear in [Goldwasser, Micali, Rackoff 851 . Let q(n) be a length function. The concept of a universal hash function, introduced in [Carter, Wegman] , has proved to have far reaching and a broad spectrum of applications in the theory of computation. consists of one such family for all pairs n and m. The following system of pairwise independent universal hash functions has several nice properties.
Let H,,,, be the set of all m by n + 1 matrices over the field with two elements. We think of a hash function from this system as h = (Af, b), where M is an m by n bit matrix and b is a bit vector of length m. Then, h(z) = (M . X) @ b. We can choose h EU H,,, by choosing h EU {O,l}("+')". Hereafter, whenever we refer to a family or system of hash functions, we mean the family defined here.
Combinatorial Lemmas
Due to its importance in such basic algorithms as primality testing, randomness has become an interesting computational resource in its own right. Recently, various studies for extracting good random bits from biased "slightly-random" sources that nevertheless possess a certa.in amount of entropy have been made; these sources model the imperfect physical sources of randomness, such as Geiger counter noise and Zener diodes, that would have to actually be utilized in real life. (See [Blum 841, [Santha, Vazirani 841 , [Vazirani 851, [Vazirani, Vazirani 851 , [Chor, Goldreich 851 [McInnes 871.) The following lemma is very useful in many of our constructions of various kinds of one-way functions and pseudo-random generators. However, it is probably best thought of as a result in the theory of slightly-randomness, rather than cryptography. Intuitively, it can be thought of as a method for extracting "good" random bits from a slightly-random source using real random bits as a "catalyst". In more detail, the va.rious components of the lemma should be interpreted as follows. Suppose we have a slightly-random source that yields a distribution on strings of length n with min-entropy greater than m. A fair coin is used to generate a random hash function mapping n bits to m -4e bits, where e is a small integer. We then sample from the slightly-random source and apply our hash function to the result. The lemma states that the resulting bits are essentially randomly distributed a.nd almost uncorrelated with the bits used to genera.te the hash function.
Thus, we have managed to convert almost all the entropy of the slightly-random source into uniform random bits while maintaining our original supply of uniform random bits. Previously, [McInnes 871 proved a related lemma.
In this extended abstract, we prove a version of this lemma that suffices for the purposes of subsequent constructions.
Many generalizations are possible, including much weaker restrictions on the hash functions used, and the substitution of Renyi entropy for min-entropy (see [Renyi 701) . These generalizations will appear in the full pa.per; some of them can be used to make our constructions more efficient. It o h(z)., where h EU H,,, and 2 ED (0, l}", is quasi-random within 6 = 3/2".
Proof : We need to show that 710 statistical test can distinguish between h. o h(z) and a random string of length IhI f 1 with probability greater than 6. Each h E II,,{ partitions (0, l}" into 2' equivalence classes, where class i is Xi(h) = (x CE {O,l}"
:
In the following, probabilities and expected values are with respect to h EU H,,l. By the properties of Ijn,,,
the set of i such that Y,(~L) is smaller than average. Let p(h) be the distinguishing probability for a statistical test. Each input h o i to the test such that the outsput is 1 adds exactly &xi(h) to p(h). F rom this, it is clear that the best test is when the output is 1 for all i E small(h), in which case p(h) = ~i~~mall~h~disc~(h).
Let toosmall = {i E {O,l)' : disci > 1/2l+"}. Using Chebychev's Inequality, the pairwise independence properties of lin,l and the fact that minentropy of D, is at least m, it is straightforward to show that Pr[i E toosmall( 5 1/22e for each fixed i E {0, l}'. We say h is bad if jloosmal/(h)I > 2'/2e. From the bound on Pr[i E toosmall( it, is easy to see that Pr[h is bad] _< 1/2e using Markov's Inequality.
For every h, p(h) _( 1. For each good h, p(h) < jtoosmall(h)l/2' -t-2'/2'+" < 2/2e. Thus, the overall distinguishing probability for the best test is at most 3/2e. 0 Can we replace the condition that D has high minentropy in Lemma 3.1 by the weaker and more natural condition that D have high entropy in the usual (Shannon) sense ? Not directly. For example, a distribution can have high Shannon entropy yet still have one element output with probability l/2; thus, any function computed based on ofle sample from this distribution generates some output with probability at least l/2, and therefore is highly non-random. This problem hints at a partial solution: take multiple independent. samples from the distribution. When di ED! (0,l)" independently for i = 1,. . . , k(n), Y = Gill ,-,., k(nj X(c&) is the sum of independent randorn variables on the interval [0,2n] with expected value Eni( Hence, by an elementary extension of Chernoff bounds, with exponentially high probability (in k(n)) Y has value within an additive factor of 7% . L(n)2/3 of its expectation.
Thus, with exponentially high probability, Y > rl-(n) . Ent(Db) -n. ,4(n)2/3. This means that only with exponentially small probability the sequence cll, . . . , dk(") has probability greater than
. Restricting 0': to the complement of this exponentially small in probability set of sequences, and renormalizing the distribution as before, we obtain E,. 0 
Computational Entropy
Intuitively, pseudo-random generators transform a small amount of randomness into a much larger string that is random for all practical purposes. Of course, in information-theoretic terms, no such increase is possible. Applying a fixed function to a string can only decrease its informational content, not increase it. (FormaJly, if D is a. distribution and f a function on the same finite set, the Shannon entropy of D is at least as large a.s that of the induced distribution f(d), where d is chosen according to D.) Thus, in some sense, any pseudo-random generator determines an ensemble that (asymptotically) has a greater computaiional entropy than it has Shannon entropy. In this section, we formalize this intuitive notion of the computational entropy of an ensemble. This definition provides one of the main conceptual tools in our paper.
Just as Shannon entropy quantifies the amount of randomness in a distribution, computational entropy quantifies the amount of "apparent" randomness (to feasible algorithms) of a distribution. For example, we can relax the notion of a generator f being pseudorandom by allowing its output to be computationally indistinguishable from an ensemble D that is not necessarily the uniform ensemble, where D has more Shannon entropy than the input to f. We call such an f a pseudo-entropy generator.
In this case, we say that the computational entropy of f is at least the Shannon entropy of D.
The notion of computational entropy is also useful in the case when the Shannon entropy of D is not necessarily greater than that of the input to $. We say that f has false entropy if the computational entropy of f exceeds the Shannon entropy of f. (but not necessarily the Shannon entropy of the input to -0
We use computational entropy in constructions of pseudo-random generators as follows. The first step is to show how to use a pseudo-entropy generator to construct a pseudo-random generator. The next step is to show how to convert any function with false entropy into a pseudo-entropy generator.
We obtain Theorem C as a direct consequence of these constructions.
ln Section 5, we prove that any one-way function in the non-uniform sense can be used to construct a function with false entropy in the non-uniform sense, thus completing the proof of Theorem A.
In the following, s(n) is a function from N to positive reak and the probability ensemble for the inputs off is U. Definition {non-uniform computational entropy) : We say f has non-uniform computational entropy at least s(n) if there is an (arbitrary) ensemble D such that D is computationally indistinguishable (in the non-uniform sense) from f(U) and Ent (D,) 2 s(n).
The difference between these two definitions is necessary so that the following proposition holds in both models of security. Let f be the (uniform/non-uniform) pseudo-entropy generator, and let D be the (polynomial-sa.mplable/arbitrary) probability ensemble with Eni 2 n + 11~~ that is computationally indistinguishable from f(U) (with length l(n)).
Let D:, be the probability distribution defined by h o IL(~/~ o . . . o oh:, where, for aIli= l,..., k(n), yi ED (0, 1)'(n) independently. By Corollary 3.3, DA is quasi-random within an exponentially small in n a.mount. Let the generator be defined byg(hozlo...ozk(,,)) = hoh(f(zl)o...of(x+))). Let Ek be the probability distribution defined by the output ofg when the input is h EU E1h(,).,(n),j(,) and, for all i = 1,. .., k(n), "ti EU (0, l}n independently.
Then, since fk (U) is computationally indistinguishable from D', it follows that E' is computationally indistinguishable from D'. &cause D' is quasi-random within an exponential small in n amount, and because by choice of k(n) tl le output of g is longer tha.n the input, g is a pseudo-random generator. D Our present goal is t,o transform a function f with false entropy into a pseudo-entropy generator g. The major obstacle is t,hat f could be many-to-one. In this case, even though the output off seemingly has more entropy than it really has, the Shannon entropy of the output off may be much less than the length of the input; intuitively the application off to the input may cause more of a loss in Shannon entropy than the corresponding gain in false entropy. For example, if f is 16-to-l, the probability distribution f(Un) has n -4 bits of Shannon entropy, four bits less than the input length.
Even if f has three bits of false entropy, f( Un)) still has one less bit of computational entropy than the input length. We need a method of recovering this loss in Shannon entropy without affecting the false entropy.
We do this in two steps. First, we let f' = fq for a suitable length function q(n). This has two effects; the false entropy in f' is q times that of f and, for a randomly chosen input z to f', the size of the preimage of f'(x) is, with high probability, relatively close to the expected preimage size.
We then apply the technique of outputting, in addition to f'(x), the out,put of a randomly chosen hash function applied to 2 that produces a string of length roughly 1x1 minus the Shannon entropy of the probability distribution determined by f'. This technique, that we refer to as "hashing the preimages of a function", is also used in proving Theorem A (see Section 5) and in ma.ny of the applications in [Impagliazzo, Luby 891 . We now give a highly intuitive presentation of this technique. Let f be a one-way function. Let ranff(z) = ]{y < z : f(y) = f(x)}], i.e. the rank of 2 among all preimages of f(x).
For now, we make the highly unreasonable assumption that ra7zk(z) is easily computable. Consider the function g(z) = f(2) 0 ranrl-(z). g(Z) is one-to-one and so Ent(g(U,)) = n, i.e. g has degeneracy zero. Furthermore, the task of inverting x is at least as hard as that of inverting f. On input for, an adversary doesn't just ha.ve to find some preimage of f(z), it has to be able to find the rib srnallest preimage. (Similarly, if f has fa.lse entropy, g has at least as much.) rank(z) is not in general computable.
However, the value of a random ha.sh function on E frequently serves the same purpose. Let g(~ o h) = f(z) o h o h(z). For a fixed value of f(x), and a random hash function h that outputs log(lJ--l(f(x)jl) bits, the distribution
is almost uniform (See Lemma 3.1), and thus could have been generated by the adversary.
Consequently, g(a: o h) is as hard to invert as f(x).
On the other hand, z is usually uniquely determined by I(Z) o h o h(c) and thus g has little degeneracy. Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 show how to construct a pseudo-entropy generator from a function f with false entropy that satisfies a technical condition: Enl(f(Un)) can be approximated fairly well in time polynomial in n. This condition is not essential; we later sketch a slightly more complicated construction of a pseudo-random generator without assuming this condition for f. Lemma 4.3 : Consider the probability ensembles D and E defined as follows. Fix and c > 0, R(n) = nc
where xi EU (0, l}" independently for i = 1,. . . , B(n) and where 11 E~J li,.k(,),j(,,).
E is given by
where the zi are randomly chosen as above and r EU (0, l}lhl+j(n).
Tl len, D, is statistically indistinguishable from E, within a.n exponentially small in 12 amount.
Proof
: We claim that, with high probability if, for i = l,..., n, we indepcndent,ly choose xi EU (0, I}" and fix y; = f(~i) then the following distribution is quasi-random within an exponentially small in n amount.
Let SYl,...rYkcnj be the set of all sequences x'10 . ..o 2' k(nI where Z: E f-'(yi).
Randomly and uniformly choose a scquencc Z: 0 . . . 0 Z&n) E S and a random h. The distribution is defined as ho h(z', o . . .o ~~~n~ ). From Lemma 3.1, this distribution is quasi-random within an exponentially small in n amount if the min-entropy of the uniform distribution on SY1,...rYk~n~ is substantially greater than j(n). Define X(y) = log (If-'(yj]) . Then, the min-entropy of the uniform distribution on SYl,...,y,(,J is simply log (ISY,,...,Yk(,) I> = c x(yi). i=l,...,k(n) This is the sum of k(n) independent random samples where the range of each possible value is [0, n]. Thus, using Chernoff bounds, the sum is within an additive factor of 72. k(n) 'I3 of its expected value with probability exponentially close to 1. The expected value of X(yi) when yi is chosen as described above is n -Enl(f(Un)).
Tl pus, the expected value of the sum is (n -Ent(f(U,))) -k(n) from which the claim follows. 0 Lemma 4.4 : Assume there is a polynomial-time computable function f with at least n-C bits of false entropy.
Assume that we can approximate Enl(f(U,))
to within an additive factor of n-('+') in time polynomial in n. Then there is a pseudo-entropy generator g.
Proof : Let Fe(n) = n3c+2, let u(n) be the approximation of Ent(f(U,)) and let j(n) = (nu(n)) * k(n) -2 n . C(n)2/3 Let g(h 0 21 0 . . . 0 zk~~)) =f (x1) Since Ent( Dn) > a(n) + n-' -n-(c+l), this quantity is at least n. -k(n) + Ihl+ 1 for our choice of k(n). D Lemma 4.5 (false entropy -+ prg) : If there is an f that has false entropy at least nwc for some constant c 2 0 then there is a pseudo-random generator. and randomly choose a string of length n as the input; thus the total length of all of our input is n's'. At least one of the candidates uses the correct value for Ent(f(Un)) and hence its output is pseudo-random. We "exclusive-or" all nc+l outputs to produce the final output of length nc+3 . Because at least one of the outputs from the candidates is pseudo-random, the final output is also pseudo-random.
Thus, we have stretched an input of length n =f2 to a pseudo-random output of length nc+3. 0 D is polynomia,l-samplable, which is needed in the uniform model of security).
Since 6(z) has correlation at least l/nc to f(z) and since p is independent of f(x), it can be shown that Ent(D,) > Eng(y( Un)) + : If there is a one-way function f (in the nonuniform sense) then there is a polynomial-time computable function g with false entropy at least 1/3n (in the non-uniform sense).
Proof : Let I(n) = [log(n + l)] and let h(n) = 2'(n) -1. Define g by
where r, x E (0, l}'", i E (0, l}'(n) (i is to be thought of as a number between 0 and h(n)) and h E H,,k(,)+l(,).
Let m(n) := jr o i o h o 21. Let WA be the uniform probability distribution strings of length m(n).
We describe a probability ensemble D that is computationally indistinguishable from g(U') such that Ent(.D,,) > Ent(g(UA)) + 1/37a. Although D is not going to be polynomial-samplable, it is easiest to think of D as being generated from roiohox ~~~ {O,l}"+) and from independently chosen bit ,0 EU (0, I}. D elne i(x) = llog(lf-l(f(~))l)J. f D(roiohoxo/?) is exactly the same as g(roiohoz) except for possibly the last bit, which in g is always r@z. The last bit of D(roiohozop) is r@a: unless i = i(z), in which case it is j3.
Let ensemble E be such that En is the distcibution on i(z) o h o cc when z tfu (0, l}" and h EU Hn,qn)+qn). We define
Claim : g' is one-way on E.
Proof of Claim : A.ssume there is an algorithm M with time bound Y'(n) that inverts g'(i o h o z) with probability at least p(n) = l/T(n) for some funct,ion T(n) in resource class R when i o h o z is randomly chosen according to E,, i.e. on input i(x) o h, of (z) o (h(z) t (i(z) + I(n))), M finds y such that f(y) = f(x) and h(y) t (i(z) + l(n)) = h(z) t (i(x) + l(n)).
w e use only the fact that f(y) = f(z) in the proof of the claim. We construct an algorithm M' with time bound polynomial in T(n) and n that inverts f(z) with probability at least p(n)/2. Let j(n) = 8log(T(n)).
On input .f(z), M' runs through all possible i = 0, . . . , k(n).
For each i, n/r' chooses h EU H,,k(,)+l (,) and s E~J (0, l}i-j(n). For each t E {o,l}j(,)+'(,), M' f orms u = s o t and simulates M on input i o h o f(z) o U. We claim that with probability at least p(n)/2 there is a round, i.e. an i and a t, where this simulation yields a y with f(y) = f(r). The round in question is when i=i(z).
Wek now that the probability that M, on input i(z)ohof(z)o(h(z) 7 (i(z)+l(n))), for z and h randomly selected, yields such a y, is at least p(n). If instead of trying the one value h(z) t (i(z) + l(n)) we try (h(x) r (i(z) -j(n>))ot for all possible extensions t E {o,lp)+'(q th e chance that M finds such a y can only increase.
Fix f(z) and consider the distribution ho(h(z') t (i(z)-j(n))) for 2' randomly and uniformly chosen from f-l (f(z)).
The distribution on z' has min-entropy
Hence, by Lemma3.1, the distribution ho(h(z') 1 (i(x)--j(n))) is statistically indistinguishable within 3p( 72) 2 from the distribution h o s when h EU H,,k(n)+, (nI and s &, (0, l}+++) . Tl rus the probability that, for at least one t, M on input i(z) o h o f(z) o s o i finds a preimage of f(z) f or s chosen at random differs from the probability when s is given by h(z) j' (i(z)-j(n)) by at most 3p(n) 2. Thus, this probability for a ra.ndom s is at least p(n) -3~47~)~ 2 p(n)/2.
From this contradiction of the one-wayness of f, we conclude that g' is one-way 011 E. End of Claim Proof
We now conclude the proof of the lemma. To distinguish D from ~((7') --q is e uivalent to being able to predict T@X, for i(z)ohoz randomly chosen according to E, and and 1' EU (0, l}", given TO g'(i(z) oh o CE). From the above claim and from Proposition 1.3 it follows that this task is computationally infeasible, and thus g( U') and D a.re computationally indistinguishable.
All that remains to be shown is that Ent(D,) > 1/3n + Ent(g(UA)).
This follows from the fact that with probability at least 1 -l/n, when zr E~,J (0, l}n alld h EU lf,,q,)+~(~), x is uniquely determined by f(z) and h(x) t (i(x) -I-1(n)). When x is fixed and i GJ (0, I}'cn), i = i(z) with probability at least l/272. Thus, with probability at least (1 -1/72)/2n 1 1/3n the last bit of g(r o i o h o x) is completely determined by the preceding bits, whereas in D(r o i o h OX o ,f3) the last bit ,0 is always independent of the preceding bits, and thus there is one extra bit of entropy in D,. Furthermore, in all cases, r 0 2 adds at most one bit of entropy to the preceding bits ofg(roiohoX). The results presented in this paper unify different concepts in theoretical cryptography.
When combined with other ,work ( [Goldreich, Goldwasser, Micah 841, [Luby, Rackoff 861, [Goldreich,  Micali, Wigderson 861, [Naor SS]) , they show that applications ranging from private key encryption to zeroknowledge proofs can be baaed on any one-way function. [Impagliazzo, Luby 891 shows that most cryptographic applications that are impossible in a world where anything that is informationally possible is computationally possible must be implicitly based on a one-way function.
Several very interesting open questions remain. We have shown that in the non-uniform model of security any one-way function yields a pseudo-random generator. Is this also true in the uniform model of security?
A more general problem is to characterize the conditions under which cryptographic applications are possible.
Although there are characterizations for some applications in this paper combined with [Impa.gliazzo, Luby 891, many others remain open. [Naor, Yung 891 give a signature scheme that can be based on any one-way permutation.
Can this assumption be weakened to give a signature scheme based on any one-way function?
Some applications seem unlikely to be shown possible based on any one-way function, e.g. [Impagliazzo, Rudich 891 give strong evidence that secret exchange is an application of this kind.
Another important issue is that of efficiency; the construction we give here for a pseudo-random generator ba.sed on any one-way function increases the size of the seed by a large polynomial amount. For practical applications, it would be nice to have a much more parsimonious construction.
We would like to develop constructions that are more efficient than the existing ones, with the goal being a private key cryptosystem based on the intractability of some natural problem that is as fast as any cryptosystem used in practice.
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